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ARTICLES

CHAOS AND THE LAW OF BORROWED SERVANT: AN
ARGUMENT FOR CONSISTENCY
J. Dennis Hynes*

The law that defines or seeks to define the distinction between general
and special employers is beset with distinctions so delicate that chaos is
the consequence. No lawyer can say with assurance in any given situation when one employment ends and the other begins.'

INTRODUCTION

As quoted in the epigraph, Justice Cardozo stated in 1921 that the
law of borrowed servant,2 dealing with the issue when one employment
ends and another begins, is in chaos. No improvement has been made
since that time. Consistency and predictability are lost values in this
area of the law. It is the purpose of this article to suggest an underlying
cause for the chaos and to propose a solution to it.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Professors Clifford Calhoun and
Mark Loewenstein read a draft of this article and offered numerous helpful suggestions and criticisms, as did my son, John. My research assistants Steve Fitzsimmons and Dana Nichols each made
valuable contributions. And a special nod to Charles Poncelow, a former student who wrote a
thoughtful paper on the liability of hospitals and independent surgeons for operating room mishaps,
which inspired me to think more about this problem.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 121 (1921).
2. The phrase "borrowed servant" enjoys frequent use in the law of agency. It is ambiguous,
however, and thus its use must be ascertained from context. Taken literally and in its narrowest
sense, it refers to the situation where a borrowing employer is vicariously liable under respondeat
superior for the negligence of a borrowed employee. It is used in a broader sense as a shorthand
reference to the entire body of law dealing with borrowed employment, and was so used in the
sentence from which this footnote was derived. Also, sometimes the words "lent" or "loaned" are
used in place of "borrowed" in the phrase "borrowed servant."
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The importance of achieving consistency and predictability in the

law is obvious to all, at least when stated as an abstract proposition.3
Consistency means that like cases are treated alike, a proposition so

fundamental that it has been part of the common law for nearly a
thousand years.4 Predictability, which is closely related to consistency, 5
has the virtue of reducing uncertainty in the law, thus enabling people
to govern their relations with some sense of what consequences will flow

from their decisions.
Greater deference is paid to the values of consistency and predictability at some times than at others. Sometimes the long term gains
achieved by establishing and consistently applying general rules are obvious to those who set the tone for the law, even at the expense of an
occasional hard case. At other times the competing value of seeking
justice in the individual case prevails at the expense of general rules. It
seems that today we have swung to the latter end of the spectrum.6
3. See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1991),
describing one of the functions performed by law as "the coordination of human interaction .....
Public, comprehensible rules permit individuals to predict the legal consequences of their actions,
and to plan and structure their social interactions." Id. at 72. Professor Smith cites to the writings of
Lon Fuller as providing the most careful elaboration of this function of law. Id. Fuller includes the
qualities of clarity, consistency, and relative constancy over time as part of an "inner morality" with
which the law must comply if it is to perform its facilitative function. Id. at 73 n.19; LON FULLER.
THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91 (rev. ed. 1969). See also Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules For a
Complex World, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1985, at A-30: "Complex rules breed uncertainty, which
breeds litigation, which in turn diverts scarce resources from productive use." Professor Epstein's
essay has as its primary focus the tendency of courts today to do justice in the individual case at the
expense of general rules. The borrowed servant rule suffers more from lack of direction and focus
than from displacement of a general and clear rule in order to do justice in an individual case. But
the point made applies with equal strength to the borrowed servant situation.
4. See I HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 9 (Sir Travers
Twiss ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1258), stating as follows: "[l]f indeed any like cases
should have occurred, let them be judged after a similar case, for it is a good occasion to proceed
from like to like."
5. Indeed, one can argue that predictability follows inexorably from consistent treatment of
like situations and thus it need not be separately identified. While true, there nevertheless is a sense
in which the word "predictability" expresses with particular clarity a fundamental value in the law.
6. Several cases involving the parol evidence rule provide an illustration of the tendency today
in some circles to search for justice in the individual case at the expense of general rules. The parol
evidence rule is designed to provide an apparently complete and final written contract special protection from claims by one of the parties to the contract that the writing does not express the full
agreement of the parties. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
137 (3d ed. 1987). The philosophy behind the rule includes the assumption that costly litigation over
terms will be reduced by establishing written contracts as something upon which one can safely rely.
Also, the assumption apparently is made that full recognition and enforcement of the rule will encourage the practice of memorializing contracts in writing, which should further advance the goal of
reducing litigation. Yet sometimes the claim that a writing does not express the full agreement of

1994]

LAW OF BORROWED SERVANT

Thus, a plea for consistency and predictability is less fashionable today.
Nevertheless, even accepting that, there exist areas of the law that
could stand some firming up, that could profitably develop some focus

and clarity, especially when this can be done without sacrificing justice
in the individual case. The law of borrowed servant is one of those
areas.
The thesis of this article is that movement toward the goal of consistency and predictability in the law of borrowed servant can be
achieved through recognition and application of a fundamental element
in the law of agency-the element that addresses loyalty-that sometimes has been overlooked by courts. The argument will be made below
that the chaos mentioned by Judge Cardozo in the epigraph stems from
a failure by some courts to address the "on behalf of" element of the
basic agency relation, not from competing policies that resist a general

rule in the interest of justice in the individual case.
the parties has a plausible and appealing ring to it. The temptation to do justice in the individual
case at the expense of the parol evidence rule under that circumstance is strong.
Justice Traynor, a key figure in this debate, argued for liberal introduction of extrinsic evidence
in an effort to do justice between the parties and ascertain their actual agreement, even at the risk
that the sympathies of the fact finder may erroneously give victory to a dishonest party. See Delta
Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968), involving a written exclusive distributorship
contract under which plaintiff was to supply locks to defendant for distribution. Defendant agreed to
sell a minimum of 50,000 locks during the first year. The agreement was "subject to termination" if
the minimum was not met. Defendant in fact sold only 10,000 locks in the first year. Plaintiff sued
for damages. The court in a 4-3 decision authored by Justice Traynor approved the admission of oral
evidence offered by defendant that defined the remedy of termination as exclusive. There was no hint
in the writing that the remedy of termination was intended to be exclusive. A separate provision in
the contract allowed for recovery of attorney's fees in any action for damages under the agreement.
This would seem to make the option of seeking damages generally available to plaintiff. Yet Judge
Traynor allowed the evidence in, noting that the termination provision did not say that it was not
exclusive, and thus the exclusivity provision could reasonably be read into the contract. One could
argue that this creates an unnatural burden for a person drafting a contract. That is, people would
not expect to have to say "and this is not exclusive" after every provision in a writing addressing a
remedy for breach.
Another case that appears to take the concept of justice in the individual case to an extreme is
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971), where defendant was sued for
damages for failure to order the minimum of 31,000 tons of phosphate specified in a written contract
between defendant and plaintiff. Defendant sought to introduce extrinsic evidence of a claimed trade
usage that characterized minimum orders between members of the mixed fertilizer industry as mere
non-binding projections to be adjusted according to market forces. The court found this evidence
admissible. 451 F.2d at 11. If believed on remand, the extrinsic evidence would destroy the written
contract between the parties by converting express price and quantity terms into mere projections to
be adjusted according to market forces. The Delta Dynamic and Columbia Nitrogen cases appear to
pay too little deference to the positive aspects of the parol evidence rule and perhaps can fairly be
cited as examples of the tendency today in some quarters to do justice in the individual case even at
substantial cost to certainty and predictability.
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THE BORROWED SERVANT SETTING

The borrowed servant" problem typically arises when an employer
sends one of its employees to do some work for a separate business.$
The employer usually is referred to as the "general employer" in the
law of agency. The separate business often is called the "borrowing" or
"special" employer." The transfer frequently is pursuant to a contract
between the general and borrowing employers which calls for compensating the general employer. It sometimes involves the transfer of
equipment as well, which the transferred employee operates pursuant
to the directions of the borrowing employer.
The general employer has no intention of severing its employment
relationship with its employee. Instead, the employee is "loaned" to another for a while. In the ordinary case the loaned employee is subject to
the instructions of the borrowing employer. The services of the loaned
employee would be of little value to the person receiving them if they
did not come with the power of direction. Consent of the employee to
this arrangement is presumed in the usual case and is rarely at issue in
7. The word "servant" has fallen almost entirely out of ordinary usage today. It retains significance in the law of agency as a term of art, however, and enjoys widespread usage by courts inthat
context. The law of agency distinguishes between servants and independent contractors when addressing the issue of vicarious liability of an employer for torts committed by persons working on its
behalf. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] § 220. A servant is "a
person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control." Id.
§ 220(1). An independent contractor is "a person who contracts with another to do something for
him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to
his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Id. § 2(3). Section 220(2) of the Restatement contains a list of various factual matters one looks to in determining if an actor is a
servant or an independent contractor, including the extent of control over details of the work,
whether the employer or the workman supplies the tools, the length of time the person is employed,
whether payment is by the time or by the job, and so forth.
8. This is a frequent occurrence, and appears to be getting more frequent all the time. Manpower, Inc., a business which specializes in providing temporary workers to other businesses, is now
the largest private employer in America, employing 560,000 people. See Janice Castro, Disposable
Workers, TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 42.
9. As will be developed infra text accompanying note 18, the use of the word "employer" in
this context may in itself play a role in causing the chaos in the law of borrowed servant. It can be
read to presume that the actor is acting on behalf of the person or business borrowing the actor's
services, when that is the issue to be proved. Its usage is widespread, however. This article will use
the traditional terminology in the interest of clarity of reference to existing cases and materials. The
phrase "borrowing employer" usually will be used in preference to the equally widely used "special
employer" because the word "borrowing" more precisely and immediately identifies the party at
issue. "Temporary employer" also occasionally is used in the literature on this subject.
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cases involving respondeat superior liability, 10 which is the focus of this
article.
Legal problems arise when the loaned employee tortiously" causes
harm to another while performing services pursuant to the instructions
of the borrowing employer. Sometimes the injured party will be a
worker on the job site who is regularly employed by the borrowing em-

ployer. The injured worker will be able to make a claim against the
borrowing employer under worker's compensation in almost all situations. 2 The question that has troubled courts, however, is whether the
injured worker also' s can hold the general employer liable on respondeat superior grounds for the negligence of its employee.
10. The matter of consent of the employee has arisen most frequently in worker's compensation law. See lB ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 48.11-.12 (1993),
explaining this in the following terms:
Although the lent servant doctrine is a familiar one at common law, and has produced some
of the most venerable [citing Laugher v. Pointer, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (1826), where horses
and a driver were borrowed by a country gentleman] and most intricate [citing Schmedes v.
Deffaa, 138 N.Y.S. 931 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912), aff'd per curiam, 108 N.E. 1107 (N.Y.
1915), where a carriage, horses and driver were loaned by one livery stable to another, which
in turn loaned them to an undertaker, who in turn loaned them an estate for a funeral] cases
in the law of master and servant, it is necessary to stress once more that the workmen's
compensation lent-employee problem is different in one significant respect: There can be no
compensation liability in the absence of a contract of hire between the employee and the
borrowing employer. For vicarious liability purposes, the spotlight was entirely on the two
employers and what they agreed, how they divided control, how they shared payment, and
whose work, as between themselves, was being done. No one paid much attention to the
employee or cared whether he had consented to the transfer of his allegiance, since, after all,
his rights were not usually as a practical matter involved in the suit. In compensation law, the
spotlight must now be turned on the employee, for the first question of all is: Did he make a
contract of hire with the special employer? . . . This must be necessarily so, since the employee loses certain rights along with those he gains when he strikes up a new employment
relation. Most important of all, he loses the right to sue the special employer at common law
for negligence; and when the question has been presented in this form, the courts have usually
been vigilant in insisting upon a showing of a deliberate and informed consent by the employee before employment relation will be a bar to common law suit.
11. Almost all of the borrowed servant cases involve negligent tortious behavior. Intentional
torts by the transferred servant would raise an additional complexity, whether the act was within the
scope of employment.
12. See I LARSON, supra note 10, § 1.10 at 1. This claim arises independently of the cause of
the injury, so long as it is work related and not self-inflicted.
13. An injured worker retains a cause of action in tort against a third person who causes the
injury. Many state worker's compensation systems require that an injured employee who recovers
both under worker's compensation and against a third-party tortfeasor must net out the overall recovery, however. Usually the proceeds are applied first to reimbursement of the employer for the
compensation outlay already made to the employee, with the balance going to the employee. See I
LARSON, supra note 10, § 1.20, at 2.
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The liability of the general employer seems obvious. An employer

ordinarily is liable for the torts of its full-time employee who negligently causes a loss while doing a task with the consent of the employer
and thus within the scope of employment."' Yet if the actor is held to
be a borrowed servant, the general employer is not liable because the

tortfeasor legally is no longer its servant. 15 Instead, the negligent actor
has become the servant of the borrowing employer. In this sense, the

phrase "borrowed servant' 6 is a term of art, one that involves serious
consequences for the parties involved.
The problem is defined in slightly different terms when the injured
person is not an employee of the borrowing employer. Under that circumstance the immunity provided the borrowing employer by worker's
compensation no longer applies and the question instead is, who is vicariously responsible for the negligence of the actor: the general employer, the borrowing employer, or both?
The law of agency has encountered surprising difficulty formulating a clear and widely adopted set of rules to apply to these fairly

straightforward situations. This confusion has persisted throughout the
19th and 20th centuries. No sign of stability or predictability has
emerged. Even the Restatement of Agency, in a rare moment of weakness, muddles this situation by uncritically embracing conflicting posi14. Actions taken under such circumstances presumably would be within the scope of employment since the employee is complying with the wishes of the general employer when working at the
site of the borrowing employer. Scope of employment is defined as follows in the Restatement:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is
not unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMENT § 228(1) (1957).
Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment "if it is different in kind from that
authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to
serve the master." Id. at § 228(2).
15. See Haight v. Aldridge Elec. Co., Inc., 575 N.E.2d 243 (II1. App. Ct. 1991), characterizing the relationship between the general employer and its employee as "suspended" during the time
the employee is performing the special service for the borrowing employer. Id. at 252.
16. The word "borrow" is a little awkward in this setting. One borrows a hammer or a saw.
One does not normally think of "borrowing" a person. Yet the usage is technically accurate. The
word "borrow" is defined to mean, "To receive temporarily from another, implying or expressing the
intention either of returning the thing received or of giving its equivalent to the lender: obtain the
temporary use of." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 256 (Unab. ed., 1961).
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tions with no recognition of the resulting inconsistencies, as will be developed below. 1"

One source of this difficulty may be that in one sense the actor is
being controlled by and performing services for both parties, which
causes confusion as to whom to hold liable. Also, the use of the phrase
"borrowing employer" may contribute to the confusion because of its
unconventional use of the word "employer" in this context."8 Ordinarily
one thinks of an employer as someone who hires and pays the acting
party. In this setting only the general employer does that. Yet both
parties are confusingly described as "employers" in almost all the court
decisions and secondary authority dealing with this topic. In addition,
the element of control plays a powerful and sometimes seductive role in
the law of agency. The exercise of (or right to the exercise of) control
over the actor by two different persons can paralyze and confuse
thought, as will be developed below.
This article will describe and evaluate the various approaches
taken by courts in this troubled area of the common law. Thereafter
one rule will be identified which should provide consistency and predictability and in addition allow most decisions to be made by a judge
as a matter of law, thus reducing the costs of litigation. A further benefit is that it will increase compensation in many cases for workers injured on the job.

II.

THE THREE JUDICIAL APPROACHES

Courts have responded to the borrowed servant problem with three
rules, 19 each inconsistent with the other. These rules will be described
and evaluated immediately below.
17. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
18. While unconventional, the terminology is not technically inaccurate. The word "employ" is
ambiguous. It means in its broadest sense "make use of." See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 743 (Unab. ed., 1961). In that sense the borrowing employer is employing the actor.
The hazard posed by the use of "employer" in this context, as noted supra note 9, is that, used
uncritically, it begs the question of whether the work is being done on behalf of the borrowing party.
This point will be developed in the text accompanying notes 44-58. As noted supra note 9, this
article utilizes the conventional terminology in view of its widespread usage by all authorities.
19. The division of this area into three rules is oversimplified to some extent. The common law
rarely falls into sharply defined, easily enumerated categories. With some borrowed servant cases it
is impossible to ascertain exactly what approach is being taken. But it is within the broad range of
accuracy to divide the different judicial approaches into three rules, each resting on a different philosophy, often unarticulated, as will be developed in the text immediately following this note.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

A.

[Vol. 14:1

THE "SPOT CONTROL" RULE

Courts utilizing the "spot control" 20 rule focus on which employer
had control over the details of the work at the time of the incident
causing injury. The leading case adopting the spot control rule is Nepstad v. Lambert.2 In that case the L.G. Arnold Company ("Arnold"),
a general contractor engaged in expanding the plant of an aluminum
company, rented a crane, operator and oiler 2" on an hourly basis from
the Truck Crane Service Company ("Truck Crane"), owned by J.M.
Lambert. The crane was used for the placement of prefabricated steel
trusses, each weighing four tons. The operator of the crane was Pasma,
a regular employee of Truck Crane. Pasma operated the crane pursuant to hand and arm signals from Morris, the foreman on the job and
an employee of Arnold. 2 Plaintiff Nepstad, a laborer working for Arnold, was severely injured2 4 when the crane made contact with a high
voltage power line. He was helping guide one of the trusses at the time.
Nepstad sued Pasma and Truck Crane, the former for direct liability2 5 and the latter on respondeat superior grounds. 26 The defense of
Truck Crane was that Pasma had been loaned to Arnold and thus it
was not subject to vicarious liability for his negligence. A jury found
that Pasma was not a borrowed servant. The trial court entered a judgment against Truck Crane based on the negligence of its servant. This
20. This descriptive phrase captures well the focal point of analysis in the decisions utilizing
this standard. One does not often see the courts themselves using it, however.
21.

50 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1951), noted in 36

MINN.

L. REV. 290 (1952).

22. In its opinion the court explained that an oiler drives the truck on which the crane is
mounted. 50 N.W.2d at 617.
23. This would be unusual today. Most crane companies when renting a large crane for a job
send along not only an operator but also an employee who gives hand signals to the operator. The
companies do not want to risk damage to their large cranes, which are expensive and difficult to
operate, by taking signals from a stranger on site. Presumably the crane company's signalman, functioning in a professional capacity, would be more alert to overhead wires and other hazards of the
crane business. Telephone interview of Dana Nichols, research assistant, with Robert N. Laingor,
Boulder Excavating Company (July 7, 1992).
24. Plaintiff "sustained burns so severe that he lost the use of one hand, lost one leg by amputation, and underwent numerous operations." Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 616.
25. A servant is personally liable for tortious behavior. Acting as the servant of another does
not somehow confer immunity upon the actor. To so hold would be to take the fiction of identity to
an extreme that no court has done. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REv. 345, 350
(1891), discussing the fiction of identity.
26. Nepstad did not include Arnold in his suit, doubtless because his remedy against Arnold
was confined to worker's compensation. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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decision was reversed on appeal on the reasoning that Pasma was a
borrowed servant as a matter of law.2 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court, after recognizing the uncertainty
of borrowed servant law,28 stated that in the main, courts have relied
on two tests in resolving these disputes. One is the "whose business"
test, which asks whose business was being furthered at the time of the
negligent act. This test appropriately was rejected by the court as valueless because, in most cases, it is impossible to name the responsible
employer through use of it. 29 It is manifestly clear that the business of
both employers was being furthered by the actions of Pasma. Focusing
on the "whose business" test accomplishes nothing unless one seeks to
hold both employers liable, a point of view that will be discussed below.
27. The effect of this decision was to reduce the compensation available to plaintiff, who was
left with only a worker's compensation claim against his employer. It is likely that the judgment he
received at trial against Truck Crane was much greater then the compensation he received from his
employer because tort damages include recovery for pain and suffering, an element of damages excluded under worker's compensation. Also, in many jurisdictions the holding in Nepstad would have
had the consequence of destroying plaintiff's independent cause of action against Pasma. Most
worker's compensation laws provide that, absent intentional wrongdoing, an employee is not liable
for an injury caused to a fellow employee. See 2A LARSON, supra note 10, § 72.21. Such provision,
however, was not part of Wisconsin law, the place of the accident, when Nepstad was decided.
Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 624.
28. The court stated, "[t]he criteria for determining when a worker becomes a loaned servant
are not precise; as a result, the state of the law on this subject is chaotic. Respectable authority for
almost any position can be found, for even within a single jurisdiction the decisions are in conflict."
Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 620.
29. An interesting distinction is drawn in 2 FLOYD R. MECHEM. LAW OF AGENCY 1447 (2d
ed. 1914), while discussing the "whose business" test. Mechem states,
If A undertakes to loan or rent or otherwise furnish servants to B to act under B's control
doing B's business, such servants while so engaged will be deemed to be the servants of B,
even though A originally hired them and pays them. If, on the other hand, A agrees to
perform certain work for B, and to furnish servants to do it, as A's undertaking and business,
they will be A's servants, even though B may have the right, either expressly or by implication, under his contract with A, to give directions to A's servants as to the time or manner or
place in which they shall perform the service, and this would not be altered by the fact that B
might have the right, under his contract with A, to hire or discharge servants for A, or to pay
the servants of A on A's account.
While this language may not be helpful in making the "whose business" test of any practical use,
nevertheless Mechem does draw an interesting distinction between the situation where the general
employer is itself discharging a contract to complete a particular job by sending employees to B and
the situation where an employee of a general employer is simply hired out to B to follow whatever
orders B may choose to give. This distinction has an appealing quality to it. It may in part account
for the division of authority in this area. Yet in the long run it must be rejected, if true transfer of
allegiance is to be the test (see infra text accompanying notes 79-83). The circumstances under
which an employee is sent to do a job matter less than who is providing regular employment to the
employee, when allegiance is the issue.
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The second test described by the court focuses on "right of control
or direction." In addressing it the court recognized and thoughtfully
discussed the inherent ambiguity of the word control, noting that "[in
a general sense," 0 both employers have control over the employee.
"The control possessed by the general employer may be more remote
than that of the special employer, but nevertheless it has real force
behind it." 3 1 The court gave as examples of this Truck Crarie's power
to discharge Pasma and to direct how the crane should be cared for.
"On the other hand, the Arnold company exercised detailed on-the-spot
control over the actual construction work done by Pasma." 3 Because
both employers exercised control, the court was faced with the question
of how to allocate liability to one of them.
The court suggested a solution to this problem by stating that,
"[s]ince both employers may each have some control, there is nothing
logically inconsistent, when using this test, in finding that a given
worker is the servant of one employer for certain acts and the servant
of another for other acts."3 3 Taking this as a premise, the court stated
that "[tfhe crucial question is which employer had the right to control
the particular act giving rise to the injury." ' ' The court adopts this
approach, noting that its theoretical basis probably is "the desire to
impose the liability upon the employer who was in the best position to
prevent the injury."3 5 This is known as the spot control test.
The court observed that "the task of defining the meaning of control remains. Detailed authoritative control must be distinguished from
mere designation of work or suggestions made incident to encouraging
cooperation between related activities on large projects." ' 6 In short, the
orders of Arnold must be commands and not requests, and must include the right to exercise detailed control over the manner in which
the work is done before Pasma can be found to be a borrowed servant.
30. Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 620.
31. Id. at 621.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 621-22. The court quoted from section 227, comment a, of the RESTATEMENT in
support of this point, as follows:
Since the question of liability is always raised because of some specific act done, the important question is not whether or not he [the negligent actor] remains the servant of the general
employer as to matters generally, but whether or not, as to the act in question, he is acting in
the business of and under the direction of one or the other.
Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 622.
35. Id. at 620.
36. Id. at 622.
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The court stated, however, that it was not necessary that the penalty
for disobedience be discharge in order to characterize orders as
commands.
Applying the spot control test to the facts before it, the court concluded as a matter of law that Pasma was under the detailed authoritative control of the Arnold company because every movement of the
crane was directed through hand signals by an Arnold company employee. In a sentence employing a justly famous metaphor in the law of
agency, the court stated "[tihe crane operator was virtually an automatic eye which caused the machinery of the crane to respond to signals given by the Arnold company's employees.''"
In a concluding passage, the court stated that the right of control
was the important factor, not the actual exercise of control.3 8 Appar37.

Id. at 623. The court developed this point as follows:

There can be no doubt that these signals carried the force of command. The work of the
crane involved moving heavy pieces of steel to within inches of workmen standing on narrow
platforms 10 or 20 feet above the ground. A hesitant response or disobedience to a signal
jeopardized their lives, and Pasma was fully aware of it. In such a situation, the orders given,
viewed realistically, must be considered authoritative.
Id.
Although the above statements sound plausible, they cannot literally be correct. All acts of
cooperation between people are not automatically converted into commands just because the stakes
are high. Suppose, for example, Pasma thought that Morris was seeking to overload the crane or to
move the load too rapidly. Doubtless Pasma could safely ignore Morris's directions. See Standard
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909) (supporting the characterization of similar conduct as
cooperative in a borrowed servant context); Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., 131 N.E.2d 593, 598
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956) ("Only [borrowing employer] knew where the scaffolding was needed and, of
necessity, it alone, was able to transmit such information to the operator of the crane. Such combined activity was no more than teamwork between two sets of workers cooperating to accomplish
the work at hand."); see also White v. Bye, 70 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. 1955), where one contractor on a
construction site had rented a crane and operator, and one day loaned them gratuitously to another
contractor on the site, who was giving signals to the operator at the time of the accident. In affirming
a judgment against the general employer, the court stated that:
The giving of signals under the circumstances of this case was not the giving of orders, but of
information; and the obedience to those signals showed cooperation rather than subordination
.... We cannot conceive of a master-servant relationship so fluid in nature that it would
attach to all of these users of equipment by the giving of a few hand signals and directions
and virtually nothing more. The relationship is deeper rooted and more fundamental.
id. at 783, 785.
38. The court elaborated that,
If the Arnold company had the exclusive right to direct all movements of the crane, then
Lambert did not; . . .The right to control is the basis for imposing this responsibility, and
the actual control exercised is merely evidence of which employer held that right. Actual
control becomes material only when an attempt is made to hold an employer personally liable
as procurer of the negligent act.
Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 623.
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ently it raised this point because Morris, the foreman, had earlier left
the site of the accident to attend to other matters. Ironically, the facts
of this tragic incident lend themselves to the inference that it was the
plaintiff himself who unwittingly directed the boom of the crane into
the high voltage wires.8 9
Evaluation of the Spot Control Test
The thoroughness of the Nepstad opinion and the force of its lan-

guage has made it one of the best known and most frequently cited
borrowed servant cases.' 0 Also, focusing on the specific act of negligence has an appealing quality to it because it identifies the time of

maximum control over the events causing injury, a natural inquiry."1
Nevertheless, the court confused analysis of the case before it by focus39. This fact would appear to destroy Nepstad's case on the ground that he was contributorily
negligent. The court opinion, however, indicated that Wisconsin, where the injury took place, is a
comparative negligence state. Id. at 616.
40. A number of cases apply the spot control test, and many of them cite to the Nepstad case
as a leading case in the field. Representative cases include Nagakawa v. Apana, 477 P.2d 611 (Haw.
1970) (crane operator and signalman rented by defendant; court followed spot control test but held
defendant not liable due to lack of detailed control because general employer used its own signalman); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 221 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ind. 1966)
(crane operator who followed signals of defendant borrowing employer held to be borrowed; court
defined standard as being "who was the master at the very time of the negligent act"); Olson v.
Veness, 178 P. 822 (Wash. 1919) ("The respondents in the course of business had transferred the
vehicle and driver to the control of the hirer, who alone could say where and in what the work of the
truck should thereafter consist, and if this effected a transfer of control it must, ipso facto, have
effected a transfer of responsibility".); Nyman v. MacRae Bros. Constr. Co., 418 P.2d 253, 254
(Wash. 1966) (borrowing employer's foreman had ordered crane operator to "pick up the hammer"
that was attached to the crane. Operator pulled wrong lever and injured plaintiff, an employee of the
borrowing employer, who sued general employer. Court affirmed verdict for defendant, upholding
jury finding that crane operator was a borrowed servant because he obeyed "specific orders" of
foreman.); McCollum v. Smith, 339 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1964) (court affirmed a directed verdict
against plaintiff, who was injured on a construction site and sued the general employer. "In deciding
this issue, a factor usually considered to be controlling is the location of the power to control the
servant, for responsibility is regarded as a correlative of power.").
41. Focusing on control can be frustrating, however, due to the ambiguity inherent in the word
"control." The court in N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 221 N.E.2d 442,
448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966), acknowledged this by saying "the results [of the control test] can vary
with the facts chosen to be emphasized." The court also quoted the following from a leading article
in this area, Talbot Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1222, 1253 (1940):
[O]ne seeking an explanation of the results of the borrow-servant cases in terms of a weighing of the elements of control is inexorably driven to the expedient of making and accepting
"desperate refinements," ethereal in substance and revolting in reason, in order to approach
any semblance of reconciliation.
It is curious that the court in N.Y. Central acknowledges these limitations on the spot control test,
yet unhesitatingly adopts the test in the case before it.
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ing exclusively on control. The question before the court was whether
the Arnold company was the master 42 of Pasma, the crane operator.
Answering that question involves making two inquiries, not just one, if
analysis is to be consistent with fundamental principles of the law of
agency. It is necessary not only to ask whether Pasma was being controlled by Arnold but also whether he was acting on behalf of Arnold. 8
The law of agency distinguishes between merely benefiting some-

one 44 and acting on behalf of someone,4 5 and defines acting "on behalf
of" as acting "primarily for the benefit of."'46 This distinction requires
42. The word "master" is a term of art in the law of agency. It signals that the person so
labelled is subject to vicarious liability for the physical torts of another, called the "servant" (supra
note 7). Both terms of art are outdated in everyday speech today, but they serve as useful signals for
respondeat superior liability, supplying greater precision to a legal discussion of these concepts. The
Restatement uses them for that reason. Of course, people are more comfortable today with the words
"employer" and "employee." This article sometimes uses those words as a substitute for master and
servant, but it is important to recognize that the words employer and employee are ambiguous since
there exist employees who are not servants and thus do not subject the employer to liability for their
physical torts. See Cooke v. E.F. Drew & Co., 319 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1963) (rejecting an argument
that a full time employee is a servant as a matter of law); RESTATEMENT § 14 N (1958).
43. The RESTATEMENT § I defines the basic agency relationship as involving three elements:
consent, control, and action on behalf of the principal. Section one reads in full as follows:
1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act.
2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
3) The one who is to act is the agent.
The following cases provide authority for the proposition that the exercise of control does not alone
create an agency relationship, even when the person exercising control directly benefits from the
relationship: Stansifer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 487 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1973) (substantial control by
Chrysler over auto distributor did not make distributor Chrysler's agent because distributor purchased the cars from Chrysler and could resell at any price, thus distributor was operating on its own
behalf when selling the cars); Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 413 N.E.2d 457 (III. Ct.
App. 1980); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (extensive control by franchisor did not make franchisee an agent of franchisor because franchisee was operating
the business for its own behalf).
44. The word "benefit" is not a term of art in the law of agency. It is used by the RESTATEMENT in its ordinary sense to mean anything that promotes or enhances well being.
45. See RESTATEMENT § 13 cmt. b (1958), stating that "the understanding that one is to act
primarily for the benefit of another is often the determinative feature in distinguishing the agency
relation from other relations." Acting "primarily for the benefit of another" is often used by the
Restatement as a synonym for acting "on behalf of."
46. Id. This distinction was addressed during the debate on the adoption of the second edition
of the Restatement. The specific context was a discussion of § 14 J of the Restatement, which
distinguishes an agent from a buyer. It states in part, "[W]hether . . . [one] is an agent for this
purpose or is himself a buyer depends upon whether the parties agree that his duty is to act primarily for the benefit of the one delivering the goods to him or is to act primarily for his own benefit."
RESTATEMENT § 14 J. In A DiSCUSSION OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, 32 A.L.I.
Proc. 174 (1955) (microfilm), Professor Seavey, speaking as Reporter for the second edition of the
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drawing a fine line in some circumstances. Yet it is important to recognize the distinction and to make every effort to draw the correct inference from the facts. The law of respondeat superior would cast far too
wide a net, unfairly imposing costs on others, if it included all circumstances where one party exercised control over another and merely benefited from the other's activity."'
In the Nepstad case it is obvious that the actions of Pasma were
intended to benefit Arnold. But were they on Arnold's behalf? In order
Restatement, responded to the following question from the floor: "Is there any authority in the cases
for the proposition that the distinction between a buyer and his agent is the extent of his benefit?"
Professor Seavey stated:
I'm sorry. I didn't use the word "benefit." I used "primarily for the benefit of." "Primarily
for the benefit," but not the extent of the benefits which are received in any given case. It is a
problem of loyalty. A buyer does not necessarily have loyalty to his seller. The agent necessarily does have loyalty. The buyer can prefer his own interests. That is what we mean, "acts
for the benefit of," not that he receives in any given case specific benefits, but whether he is
under a duty to prefer the interests of the other party or his own. In any case of conflict, an
agent must prefer or at least must not ignore the interests of his principal.
We have only the factor of loyalty. That is important and you cannot get along without
it. That is the thing beside which all others fade into insignificance. Once we have loyalty--or
no loyalty as opposed-then we have agency or no agency. The difficulty comes when you
determine whether or not that situation exists, and that is why we give these factors, to
determine whether ultimately he has the duty of loyalty.
Id. at 190, 193.
The above quotation is in the context of distinguishing an agent from a buyer, which is unrelated to
the subject of this paper. Nevertheless, the language relating the "on behalf of" element to the
fiduciary aspects of the agency relationship, and noting that the agent must be loyal to the principal
and is under a duty to prefer the principal's interests, is directly relevant to the question whether a
borrowing employer is the master of a borrowed worker. It seems clear that in the ordinary case the
actor does not owe a duty of loyalty to the borrowing employer. If the interest of the borrowing
employer and the general employer conflict in any way, it is hard to imagine the worker preferring
any interest other than that of the person providing regular employment to the worker.
47. Consider the situation of a newspaper carrier whose manner of delivery is controlled by the
subscriber ("Throw the paper over here. Don't ever throw it over there.") and whose actions in
delivering the paper clearly benefit the subscriber. Would it be sensible and fair to hold the subscriber strictly liable for torts committed by the carrier while delivering the paper? To the knowledge of the author, the answer to that is no in all jurisdictions. The actions of the carrier, while
benefiting the subscriber, are not on behalf of the subscriber. The carrier is either conducting her
own business or is working for the newspaper. The foreman illustration mentioned in the text immediately following infra note 50 provides another example of the importance of distinguishing between
benefit and on behalf of. A foreman is benefited by the actions of the workers he controls because if
the work is not done the foreman will not be paid, yet the work is not done on the foreman's behalf.
Finally, the Stansifer, Slates, and Stanford cases, discussed supra note 43, provide clear evidence of
situations where the extensive exercise of control, coupled with benefit to the controlling party, did
not result in an agency relationship. Action "on behalf of" was also required by those courts and was
found to be missing in the cases before them. The cases are not physical tort liability cases, but the
fundamental elements of the agency relationship apply equally to those situations and that being
addressed by this paper.
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to answer that question it is necessary to ask whether Pasma was acting primarily for the benefit of Arnold and thus owed a duty of loyalty
to Arnold. It seems clear that was not the situation. Pasma was hired
by and was being paid by another, Truck Crane, who had instructed
him to do the job for Arnold. The inference is strong that Pasma was
acting primarily for Truck Crane.4 8 If the interests of Truck Crane and
Arnold had come into conflict in any way, it is hard to imagine Pasma
not preferring the interests of the person who pays him. The Nepstad
court did not address the issue in these terms,49 perhaps because it
equated mere benefit with acting on behalf of, a mistake that has been
0
made before in the law of agency.
The opinion in Nepstad does not seem to recognize that one can
control in detail the actions of another without being the master of the
person being controlled. A common example of this is the foreman of a
construction crew issuing orders to workers on the job. It is difficult to
imagine a more genuine illustration of control over the details and
manner of the work of others. Yet no authority would hold a foreman
vicariously liable for the negligence of a worker. This is because the
worker is not acting on behalf of the foreman; instead, they are coemployees. Both the worker and the foreman are working on behalf of
their common employer, who hired and is paying them.
Perhaps the assumption underlying the court's concern about control was that unless a controlling party is subject to respondeat superior
liability there is no incentive for it to act responsibly. This assumption
is false. A controlling person is subject to a standard of liability, that of
negligence. The common law of torts for centuries has held persons
48.

In support of the inference that the general employment continues, see § 14 L of the
which has as its subject the ambiguous principal problem, addressing situations not
involving physical torts. Comment a to § 14 L contains the following language on this point: "The
ultimate question is whether it is understood that the agent owes primary allegiance to the general
employer or to the other party. In answering this question, there is an inference that the general
employment continues." RESTATEMENT § 14 L cmt. a (1958).
49. Indeed, it did not address this issue at all. Instead, it focused exclusively on the matter of
control, as if that answered all questions of respondeat superior liability.
50. See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981), dealing
with the liability of a controlling creditor as a principal under § 14 0 of the Restatement. The court
in the Cargill case, which (as in Nepstad) was the Minnesota Supreme Court, placed its focus on
control and found liability for the controlling creditor despite the lack of any credible evidence of
action by the debtor on behalf of the creditor. See J. Dennis Hynes, Lender Liability: The Dilemma
of the Controlling Creditor, 58 TENN. L. REV. 635, 650-656 (1991) (commenting on the Cargill
case).
RESTATEMENT,
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exercising control over others to a duty of due care. 5 ' Thus the Arnold

company was subject to a duty of care while guiding the crane.5 2 That
is very different from holding it strictly liable for the negligence of
Pasma, a person who was not hired by Arnold and who it could not
discharge or effectively discipline. 3
51. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 510 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that if an employer of an independent contractor exercises control over any part of the
project "he is required to exercise reasonable care for the protection of others.
); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
52. It should be possible to litigate the issue of due care without undue difficulty and expense
when the defendant is a borrowing employer, as contrasted with a true employment relationship. The
unusual difficulties involved in proving negligence of a master, which are used by some scholars to
justify the imposition of strict liability, are not present when dealing with a borrowing employer. See
Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to "'Respondeat Superior," HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 449
(1934), addressing the difficulties of proof which would be involved in holding a master only to a
negligence standard, stating as follows:
Another reason for liability without fault in many cases is the difficulty of proving negligence.
This reason is particularly cogent in imposing liability upon a master. Whether an employee
was unfit at the time of the accident or whether there was improper supervision would ordinarily have to be proved by the testimony of fellow workers. Truthful testimony in such cases is
difficult to obtain from the members of a well-disciplined organization. Aside from self-interest, which is obvious, only disgruntled fellow-workers are likely to subject themselves to the
name commonly applied to a "taltle-tale" within the organization.
See also Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J.LEGAL STUD. 29, 43 (1972) (explaining
why strict liability applies to employers by observing that under a negligence system the courts
would have "to regulate in great detail the company's methods of selecting, supervising, and disciplining employees").
Both of the above explanations reinforce the assumption that applying a standard of due care to
a borrowing employer is feasible. The negligent actor is a stranger in relation to the rest of the work
force, thus avoiding the problems identified by Professor Seavey. The borrowing employer does not
select or discipline the actor, thus avoiding the problems identified by Professor (now Judge) Posner.
53. It is difficult to see how Arnold could effectively discipline Pasma. Arnold could not
threaten Pasma with job termination, nor could it threaten to dock his pay, change his working
conditions, or give him a poor reference. It is true that Arnold could threaten Pasma with reporting
negligent or uncooperative behavior to Truck Crane. Under some circumstances this could act as a
spur to appropriate behavior, but it is no substitute for the power to fire or reduce wages. But see
Olson v. Veness, 178 P. 822 (Wash. 1919), where the court stated, "If Clark [borrowing employer]
had been dissatisfied with Smith's [driver] services, he could have effected his discharge or removal
by complaint to the respondents [general employer], or, by terminating the hiring of both truck and
driver; the fact of the discharge would originate with the dissatisfied hirer, though the actual words
might alone come from the original employer of the servant." There is some truth to what the court
says, but it takes too narrow a view of the matter. In the absence of an extreme case, a borrowing
employer doubtless would hesitate to interrupt its work schedule by sending the truck and driver
away from the job site. And it will not be every case where the general employer will immediately
fire its employee merely because of one complaint about performance.
<3
For a recent case addressing these issues by drawing a distinction between supervision and control, see Harris v. Miller, 407 S.E.2d 556, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). Harris involved a suit against
a doctor for the negligence of a nurse anesthetist during an operation the doctor was conducting. The
court held the doctor not liable, noting that "[A] servant of one employer does not become the
servant of another for whom the work is performed merely because the latter .. .supervises the
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The strict liability of respondeat superior 5' is imposed by the law
of agency on employers in part due to the special position an employer

as principal 55 enjoys, that of having a person chosen by the employer
act both on its behalf and subject to its detailed control. With that
position go certain burdens imposed by the common law, including

strict liability for the harms caused by the actor within the scope of

employment.56 It has not been considered fair to hold a defendant
strictly responsible for a negligent loss caused by another who was not
chosen by the defendant"' and who was not acting on the defendant's

behalf. 8

As noted previously, the court in Nepstad stated that "[s]ince both
employers may each have some control, there is nothing logically incon-

sistent, when using this test, in finding that a given worker is the servant of one employer for certain acts and the servant of another for
other acts."59 That statement is true as an abstract proposition.60 But it
performance thereof .... " Instead, there "must be evidence that the surgeon has the right to
control the work." The court defines control as "the right to select, and accordingly discharge, the
alleged employee." Id. at 563 (emphasis added by court). The North Carolina Supreme Court has
since reversed the decision in Harris on other grounds. Harris v. Miller, 438 S.E.2d 731 (N.C.
1994).
54. The liability of the master under respondeat superior ("let the master respond") is strict in
nature rather than fault based. Seavey, supra note 52. An inquiry into the care an employer exercises when hiring and supervising an employee thus is irrelevant in a respondeat superior case, which
focuses only on whether the actor was a servant acting in a tortious manner within the scope of
employment. See WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 141 (1964).
55. A master is a principal. All masters are principals, but not all principals are masters. The
dividing point is based on control over means and details of the work being done. The tortious conduct that triggers the above distinction is physical tort liability. Because the word master is included
within the word principal, this article will sometimes use the word principal when a broader point
than liability for physical torts is being addressed.
56. The rationale for imposing common law strict liability has never been fully explained to
the satisfaction of many readers despite the existence of a number of sophisticated, thoughtful essays
on the topic. The main arguments for and against vicarious liability, and citations to the literature
on the subject, are contained in J. DENNIS HYNES. AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP. CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 76-80 (4th ed. 1994). The existence of a common law right of indemnification by the
principal against the agent for losses imposed upon the principal by the agent's misconduct has done
much to reconcile people's minds to the theory, although in many instances the right of indemnification exists more in theory than in practice. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 488 P.2d
429 (Or. 1971) (containing a lengthy discussion of the policy behind the right of indemnification).
57. It is true that defendant by choice entered into a contractual arrangement with Pasma's
employer, but that is distinct from choosing Pasma for the job of operating the crane.
58. See supra note 43 for the definition of the agency relationship describing the necessary
element of acting on behalf of the principal. This limitation is fundamental to the moral foundation
of the law of agency in the sense that it is unfair to impose strict liability for the acts of others on a
person unless, as a minimum, the acts are being taken on behalf of the person being held strictly
liable.
59. Nepstad, 50 N.W.2d at 621.
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is flawed in the context in which the court places it. The court qualified
its statement by saying "when using this test." The flaw lies in the test
itself, which focuses exclusively on control.

B.

THE DUAL LIABILITY RULE

Dual liability, where the court finds both employers liable, is a
separate and distinct approach taken in the law of borrowed servant.
Gordon v. S.M. Byers Motor Car Co.61 is the classic case on dual liability. In Gordon, a truck and driver (Lewis) were loaned by the Byers
Motor Car Company ("Byers"), which was in the business of selling
trucks, to one J.N. Hazlett ("Hazlett"), who was engaged in the wholesale gasoline business and was interested in purchasing a truck. It was
agreed that a truck and driver would be furnished to Hazlett for one
week, presumably demonstrating to him that the truck was suitable for
his business. If at the end of the week Hazlett was satisfied, he agreed
to buy the truck. If he was not satisfied, he agreed to pay a per diem
fee for the use of the truck and driver.
Lewis reported to Hazlett, filled the truck with a load of gasoline,
and was told by Hazlett to deliver the gasoline to Minor, a customer of
Hazlett's. In the course of delivery Lewis negligently caused an explosion and fire on Minor's premises by manipulating the flow mechanism
of the truck under unusual circumstances in close proximity to an open
gas flame. 2 The explosion killed plaintiff's husband. She sued both Byers and Hazlett as joint tortfeasors. The jury found both liable. The
trial judge, reasoning that he might have misled the jury by submitting
the case against both defendants to them, gave a judgment n.o.v. for
60. There are many cases in the law of agency where agency status is divided according to
functions performed. This point often is made in the ambiguous principal context. See RESTATEMENT
§ 14 L, supra note 48. One pattern that frequently recurs in litigation involves group health or life
insurance, where an employer assumes responsibility for administering aspects of a group policy that
covers its employees. A mistake is made by the employer. Liability turns on whose agent the employer was when it made the mistake. See Norby v. Bankers Life Co., 231 N.W.2d 665 (Minn.
1975) (containing an extensive and careful discussion of the law on this matter).
61. 164 A. 334 (Pa. 1932).
62. The gasoline would not flow into the underground storage tanks in Minor's garage, apparently because it was disturbed by the drive to the garage. Rather than letting the truck stand for a
time, Lewis climbed onto it and opened a large cap 12 inches in diameter, called a manhole cover.
There was so much pressure in the tank that the cap flew off. The gasoline overflowed from the top
of the truck and ran across the garage floor until it reached a stove with an open gas flame approximately 40 feet away in an office in the garage. The resulting explosion killed both the plaintiff's
husband and Lewis. Id.
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Hazlett and granted a new trial to Byers. Plaintiff appealed from this
decision.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed with instructions to
enter judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff against both defendants.
The reasoning in this brief opinion is captured in the following
quotation:
Lewis, thus in the sales service of Byers Company as demonstrator, was
transferred to the service of Hazlett, also to do his work as directed by
him. The employment involved a double service: (a) to Byers Company;
(b) to Hazlett.
He was acting for both parties in accord with their common understanding; the power of control as to one part of this work being in Byers
company, and, as to the other part, in Hazlett.
He was promoting the interest of Byers Company in manipulating
the machinery on the truck to cause the gasoline to flow for, obviously, if
the mechanism on the tank would not discharge the load, Hazlett would
hardly wish to purchase the truck. . . . Lewis was also complying with
specific instructions in delivering the gasoline. The conduct, which the
jury doubtless found to be negligent, was an act or acts done on behalf of
both . . .they are joint tort-feasors.63
Evaluation of the Dual Liability Rule
The reasoning in the Gordon case is both appealing and troubling.
It is appealing because treating the acts of Lewis as attributable to
both Byers and Hazlett seems to be an obvious solution to the borrowed
servant problem. In one sense, Lewis indeed was acting for both while
doing the negligent act. Also, both were exercising control over his conduct, directly or indirectly. So why not hold both liable? Yet justifying
dual liability under the common law by characterizing Byers and Hazlett as joint tortfeasors is troubling because the facts in the Gordon
case are far removed from conventional joint tortfeasor liability.
Joint tortfeasor liability is defined as follows in a widely respected
treatise: "All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to
commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or
ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit, are equally
liable."6' 4 It cannot fairly be said that Byers and Hazlett had a "coin63.
64.

Id. at 335-336.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 51, at 323.
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mon plan or design" to commit, encourage, or ratify a tortious act.
Instead, each was advancing his own purpose, and both were pursuing
a lawful act which tragically miscarried as a result of negligence.
Also, it is clear that Byers and Hazlett were not partners, which
would create joint liability, because they were not co-owners of a business for profit.6 5 They were not joint venturers because they did not
share profits generated by a business venture jointly entered into,66 nor
were they carrying out a joint enterprise 67 in any conventional meaning
of that phrase. Instead, each was furthering his own enterprise. In finding joint liability under the circumstances before it, the Gordon opinion
overlooks the well known doctrine of the common law that "a man cannot serve two masters at the same time; he will obey the one and betray
the other."6 8
The court's finding of common law joint and several liability for
Byers and Hazlett thus is curious and unconventional. That alone does
not make it wrong, of course, but on the merits the decision is questionable because the policy underlying joint and several liability for the
wrongs of others does not apply to the borrowed servant situation. In
65. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 7 U.L.A. (Master Ed. 1969), defining a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
66. Joint ventures are treated as partnerships. The definition of a joint venture is the same as a
partnership except that the business is usually limited in scope. It is essential that the parties share
profits from the venture in order for a joint venture to exist. See Connor v. Great Western Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a savings and loan was not a joint venturer with
a developer of a large tract despite the exercise of considerable control because it did not share in
profits with the developer). The arrangement between Byers and Hazlett clearly was not a joint
venture.
67. The definition of a joint enterprise has been narrowing in recent times. It used to include
almost any activity undertaken jointly. It has now been confined in most jurisdictions to shared
income generating activities, thus treating joint enterprises the same as joint ventures. See Holliday
v. Bannister, 741 P.2d 89 (Wyo. 1987) (articulating the modern approach to this doctrine).
68. This frequently quoted language is taken from the case of Atwood v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 72 F. 447 (W.D. Mo. 1896). It reads in full as follows:
It is a doctrine as old as the Bible itself, and the common law of the land follows it, that a
man cannot serve two masters at the same time; he will obey the one and betray the other.
He cannot be subject to two controlling forces which may at the time be divergent. So the
English courts, which are generally apt to hit the blot in the application of fundamental rules,
hold that there can be no application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in its application
to two distinct masters; that the servant must be subject to the jurisdiction of one master at
one time.
Id. at 455.
Another well known quotation on this issue is contained in the opinion of Littledale, J., in Laugher v.
Pointer, 5 B.&.C. 547, 558, 108 Eng. Rep. 204, 208 (1826), stating, "The coachman or postillion
cannot be the servant of both. He is the servant of one or the other, but not the servant of one and
the other; the law does not recognize a several liability in two principals who are unconnected."
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all of the joint and several liability situations noted above, the parties
are jointly engaged in a common activity that is designed to benefit
each of them through gains generated by the activity itself, either fiscally (partnership and joint venture) or through whatever objective is
sought to be achieved by jointly committing a tort against another
(joint tortfeasors). The borrowed servant situation does not fit this mold
since no proceeds are generated from the activity and shared by the
employers. Instead, each employer is engaged in its own business with
its own profits or losses, and has no interest in the business of the other
employer.
The opinion in the Gordon case is questionable not only because it
imposes joint and several liability on people who are not acting in concert. It also overlooks an independent basis of liability for the borrowing employer (Hazlett), namely, direct liability based on a duty of care
created by his control over Lewis.69 And it stretches vicarious liabil-

ity-a fearsome weapon-to cover a defendant (Hazlett) who did not
choose and could not effectively discipline the negligent actor. Finally,
it seems odd to stretch doctrine in order to compensate injured persons

in this context. In every borrowed servant situation the injured party
already has two defendants available: the negligent actor and the person who is found to be the master of the actor. That would seem to
reduce the incentive to depart from well accepted doctrine in order to
add a third person as defendant.7 0 Perhaps for these reasons the
69. It may be that sending Lewis out with a full load of gasoline to be delivered to a customer,
apparently without any inquiry into his experience and competence, would lay the basis for a plausible case in negligence against Hazlett, especially since Lewis seemed unfamiliar with the dangers
posed by gasoline in a disturbed state.
70. The policy underlying dual liability was thoughtfully addressed in DePratt v. Sergio, 306
N.W.2d 62 (Wis. 1981), a case involving facts similar to the Nepstad case. Plaintiff argued that
both employers should be responsible under an enterprise theory of liability because "both exercise a
degree of control, both profit from the employee's conduct, and both are capable of planning for and
transferring the losses incurred." Id. at 64. Plaintiff further contended that the borrowed servant rule
is difficult to apply, leading to unpredictable and inconsistent results. The court conceded "that the
traditional borrowed servant rule has deficiencies in theory and in application." Id. at 65. It concluded, however, that the dual liability approach does not offer a simple and easily applicable alternative, noting that it would still be necessary to decide whether each employer retained sufficient
control to be classified as a master. Also, "courts would have to decide how responsibility and liability should be allocated to each employer. One way of allocating responsibility and liability between
the employers is on the basis of their degree of control over the employee's conduct." Id. The court
noted that this would involve the same difficult factual problems that are involved in the borrowed
servant control test. Thus the dual liability approach does not promise "greater certainty or precision
in its application than the current approach." Id. Finally, instead of diminishing unfairness the dual
liability approach "might ... add unfairness in an already troubled area." Id. The court gave as an
example the case before it where if the plaintiff's argument succeeded one of the two employers
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Gordon decision has not enjoyed widespread acceptance in the more
71
than 50 years since it was decided.
C. THE TRANSFER OF ALLEGIANCE RULE
The transfer of allegiance rule differs sharply from the spot control
and dual liability rules. It will not classify a servant who is furthering
the business of the general employer as borrowed unless command has
been totally surrendered and a new relation can be inferred.
The transfer of allegiance test was succinctly set forth by Judge
Cardozo in the case of Charles v. Barrett.72 In that case Steinhauser,
who was in the trucking business, supplied a truck and driver to the
Adams Express Company at an hourly rate. Adams loaded the truck
using its own employees, sealed the truck, and sent the driver to a railroad terminal where the truck would be unloaded, again by Adams'
would have to pay the entire tort judgment because the liability of the other employer by statute was
limited to worker's compensation. Id.
The court in DePratt comes to the same conclusion as the author with regard to the undesirability of the dual liability rule, but for different reasons. The court appears to accept the plaintiff's
premise that enterprise liability applies to both employers. That premise is challenged in this article
on the reasoning that the acting party cannot fairly be considered part of the borrowing employer's
enterprise until one can reasonably conclude that the actor's allegiance has been transferred to the
borrowing employer. Until then, it is not fair to impose strict liability on the borrowing employer.
71. The following are the leading cases that have adopted the dual liability rule: Kastner v.
Toombs, 611 P.2d 62, 65 (Alaska 1980) (backhoe and operator rented in order to excavate a ditch.
The ditch caved in and injured an employee of the borrowing employer. The court stated in its brief
opinion that, "We see no reason for a rule of exclusive liability in situations in which a servant..."
may act for two masters simultaneously. The loss can be distributed among the employers "in accordance with principles of contribution and indemnity."); Keitz v. National Paving & Contracting Co.,
134 A.2d 296, 302 (Md. 1957) (five trucks and drivers were hired by borrowing employer to supplement its own fleet of eight trucks; borrowing employer accounted for 80% of general employer's
business; court approved instructions allowing jury to find dual liability, quoting the following from a
similar case: "when it is borne in mind that the trucks of the company [borrowing employer] and
those of Gresham [general employer] were used in precisely the same manner, and that both sets of
trucks were subject to the same direction and control, it is obvious that the company acquired an
authority over the actions of Gresham's drivers incompatible with the position of independent contractor on his part."); Strait v. Hale Constr. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
The following cases are sometimes cited as supporting the dual liability approach, but they can
be explained on other grounds. In Colorado and Southern Rwy Co. v. Duffy Storage and Moving
Co., 361 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1961), the borrowing employer paid part of the wages of the employee, a
railroad engineer, pursuant to a long-standing arrangement between two railroads with regard to a
particular run. The inference of a true joint employment under those circumstances is strong. In
Vance Trucking Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 249 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1966), affid, 395 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.
1968), the two employers divided between them the gross revenues generated by the hauling of
tobacco. The inference of a true joint venture under those circumstances is compelling.
72. 135 N.E. 199 (N.Y. 1922).

1994]

LAW OF BORROWED SERVANT

employees. While on route the driver negligently struck and killed
plaintiff.
Plaintiff's executor sued Adams Express for vicarious liability on
respondeat superior grounds, arguing that the driver was a borrowed
servant. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law.
The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint.7 8 The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. In a unanimous opinion
written by Judge Cardozo the decision of the Appellate Division was
affirmed. 4 Judge Cardozo reasoned as follows in this brief opinion:
We think that truck and driver were in the service of the general

employer. There was no such change of masters as would relieve Steinhauser of liability if the driver of the van had broken the seals, and stolen the contents. By the same token, there was no such change as to
relieve of liability for other torts committed in the conduct of the enterprise. Where to go and when might be determined for the driver by the
commands of the defendant. The duty of going carefully, for the safety
of the van as well as for that of wayfarers, remained a duty to the master
at whose hands he had received possession. Neither the contract nor its
performance shows a change of control so radical as to disturb that duty
or its incidence. The plaintiff refers to precedents which may not unreasonably be interpreted as pointing in a different direction. Minute analysis will show that distinguishing features are not lacking. Thus, in Hartell v. T.H. Simonson & Son Co., 218 N.Y. 345, 113 N.E. 255, the
special employer used his own truck. The submission to a new "sovereign" was more intimate and general. Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416,
418, 63 N.E. 922. We do not say that in every case the line of division
has been accurately drawn. The principle declared by the decisions remains unquestioned. At most the application is corrected. The rule now
73. The opinion of the Appellate Division is contained in 190 N.Y.S. 137, 140-41 (1921). The
court reasoned that:
At the time of the accident the driver [Moses] was upon the business of his employer Steinhauser, engaged in earning the $2 an hour which the company [Adams Express, the borrowing employer] agreed to pay Steinhauser for the transportation of its goods by means of his
truck. No claim was made upon the trial nor upon this appeal that [Adams Express] had any
voice in the selection of [Moses], and it was powerless to discharge him. Under such circumstances it cannot reasonably be claimed that Moses was the servant of the express company
at the time of the accident.
[Steinhauser] was an independent contractor, and undertook to transport goods for [Adams Express] in consideration of the payment of $2 an hour for the use of his car in such
transportation. As between [Adams Express] and Steinhauser the contract was merely one of
service.
In following [Adams Express's] instructions . . . [Moses] was merely performing the
work of his employer . . ..
74. 135 N.E. at 200. The opinion indicates that Hogen, J., did not vote in the case.
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is that as long as the employee is furthering the business of his general
employer by the service rendered to another, there will be no inference of
a new relation unless command has been surrendered,
and no inference
75
of its surrender from the mere fact of its division.
The opinion in the Charles case focuses on control but in a different way than the Nepstad opinion. The Nepstad court was willing to
look at division of control and hold a servant borrowed even though
some control was retained by the general employer. The court in
Charles poses a much more demanding standard, insisting on a total
surrender of control before it will infer a "new relation" and recognize
a new master in the borrowing employer.
What aspect of the law of agency is Judge Cardozo referring to
when he writes about a "new relation" or a "new sovereign"? One inference that can be drawn is that he is addressing the matter of loyalty,
which goes to the essence of the agency relationship. 77 Judge Cardozo
seems to be saying that the employee driving the truck owed his loyalty
to Steinhauser, the general employer, who hired and was paying him
and who sent him to do the work he was doing at the time of the accident. It is inferred that he was working on Steinhauser's behalf unless a
legitimate inference of a new relation could be drawn. A division of
control, like that in the Charles case, will not support an inference of a
new relation because the contractual relationship between the general
and borrowing employers contemplated such division. That is, it was
75. Id. at 199-200.
76. Perhaps the facts of Winchester v. Seay, 409 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn. 1966), could serve as an
example of a true "new relation." In that case a full-time handyman for a hotel was told by his
employer to do "any little thing" for the owners of a restaurant two doors away. The owners of the
restaurant were residents of the hotel. They would give the handyman a tip after doing work for
them. This relationship went on for some time. One day at the request of one of the owners of the
restaurant the handyman helped install a metal plate in an air conditioner in the restaurant, and
injured himself. The work was done without the knowledge of his general employer. In this worker's
compensation case the court held that the restaurant owners, not the general employer, were responsible for the injury, reasoning that they were "employers" for purposes of the activity giving rise to
the injury. The consent of the general employer to lending the handyman was gratuitous, he did not
even know about the particular activity causing the injury, and the restaurant owners tipped the
handyman whenever he worked for them. On those facts it plausibly can be argued that the handyman was acting primarily for the benefit of the restaurant owners at the time of the injury, and thus
a new relation was created.
77. As noted supra notes 44-47, the requirement of loyalty in the agency relationship is most
clearly connected to the "on behalf of" element of the relationship. The full definition of the agency
relationship is set forth supra note 43. The Restatement was not in existence at the time that the
Charles case was decided. But the fundamental principle of loyalty as the essence of an agency
relationship long predated the Restatement and came from a large body of precedent that was
crafted into a definition by the drafters of the Restatement.
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understood from the outset that the employee would continue to serve
the general employer by acting pursuant to the directions of the borrowing employer. In short, the general employer was an independent
78
contractor supplying a worker to do a job.
Although Judge Cardozo does not use the word "allegiance," one
way to characterize his approach is to ask if one can fairly infer from
the facts of a particular case whether the actor's allegiance has been
transferred and thus a new relation can be found. 79 As noted above, the
Nepstad and Gordon opinions, which give no hint of such analysis,
seem to have lost sight of the fact that the basic agency relationship
involves three elements (consent, control, and on behalf of"), not just
two (consent and control). 8 1 Of the three cases only the Charles case
appears to see this clearly.
Under the Charles test an employee would almost never be found
to be the servant of the borrowing employer.8 2 Under what circumstances realistically would a true transfer of allegiance take place, considering that the employee is paid by the general employer and thus
would naturally tend to give preference to the interests of that person? 83 It is especially difficult to imagine a transfer of allegiance when
78. The Appellate Division opinion in the Charles case, quoted supra note 73, clearly expresses this characterization of the relationships.
79. In one sense this is related to the issue whether an employee has left the scope of employment prior to or contemporaneously with a tortious act. In general, courts look for "abandonment"
of the employment, which occurs when an employee is off on a personal venture, even while continuing to be paid by the unknowing employer. When an employee has abandoned the employment, the
employer is no longer vicariously liable for the misconduct of the employee. Under such circumstance the employee's allegiance is no longer with the employer, as a factual matter.
80. The allegiance test is another way of expressing the "on behalf of" element, with the
underlying issue being addressed that of loyalty.
81. See supra note 43. It can be argued that the court in Gordon, supra note 61, does not fail
to recognize the importance of all three elements because it in effect held that Lewis was acting on
behalf of both employers. This fails, however, to confront the maxim that a servant cannot give full
allegiance to two masters with respect to the same act unless the masters are engaged in joint
activity.
82. Indeed, one could characterize the Charles approach as destroying the borrowed servant
rule, on the reasoning that an employee always is going to retain at least some allegiance to the
person who is paying him or her. Only routine issues under the independent contractor defense, such
as the applicability of the nondelegable duty exception, would remain. The author sees no great
harm in that.
83. Although payment of salary supports a strong inference of loyalty, it would not be conclusive in all cases. Cardozo himself suggests a different result when the equipment is supplied by the
borrowing employer. Perhaps under those circumstances a question of fact for the jury would exist,
whereas the Charles case was decided as a matter of law. Also, the liability of the general employer
might cease if its employee obeys an order of the borrowing employer to do an act beyond the
employee's ordinary duties, involving something that the general employer would not anticipate. For
example, suppose a crane operator obeys an instruction of the borrowing employer to leave the crane
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equipment of the employer also is transferred to the job site. The employee naturally is going to have some concern for the safety and care
of the equipment owned by the general employer, who put the em-

ployee in charge of it.
Evaluation of the Charles Approach

Under the transfer of allegiance test the general employer would
remain liable for the torts of its employee in almost all cases. 84 Most
8 In this
cases would be decided as a matter of law, as in Charles."
sense, the transfer of allegiance test would bring consistency and pre-

dictability to the law. Also, in many situations it would result in an
increase in compensation because a worker injured on the job site
would have a respondeat superior claim against the general employer in
almost all cases. 86 This contrasts with the spot control approach, which
in the Nepstad case confined the injured worker to a worker's compensation claim against his employer and a negligence claim against the
crane operator, an unlikely source of compensation. The transfer of allegiance test also appears to be sound economically, not only because
the general employer is the one who is most likely to carry insurance
covering the torts of the negligent actor but also because ordinarily the
price of the general employer's product should bear this expense, as
will be developed below.
momentarily and drive a truck owned by the borrowing employer away from the site in order to
make room for further work. The crane operator negligently injures someone while driving the truck.
A change of allegiance under such setting readily can be found. One can argue that the operator had
left the scope of employment of the general employer and was on a personal venture, working temporarily for another. This setting is well beyond the normal run of borrowed servant cases, however.
84. As noted supra note 83, an exception to this would be those cases in which the servant is
doing an extraordinary act, outside of the contemplated arrangement of the parties. Predictability
and certainty would still be served in the ordinary circumstance, which seems to be as far as that
goal can be achieved in the law. The goal of predictability through placing the loss on the general
employer also is advanced by Richard W. Power, It's Time to Bury the Borrowed Servant Doctrine,
17 ST. Louis U. L.J. 464 (1973). Professor Power proposes a statutory solution, leaving liability with
the general employer except for gratuitous loaning of domestic servants. His thesis rests on pragmatic grounds, arguing that the accident prevention potential of immediate control is largely illusory
and that only the kind of control exercised by the general employer, including the power to discipline
and discharge, has significant accident prevention potential.
85. In contrast, the spot control test frequently would call for submission of the case to a jury,
it seems, in view of its situation-specific focus on the factual issue of control.
86. This would not include all borrowed servant cases, but many cases involve job site injuries
where the injured party is trying to avoid the damages limitations that are part of Worker's Compensation. As noted supra note 13, in many jurisdictions double compensation is avoided by reimbursing the injured worker's employer for sums paid under Worker's Compensation.
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These factors speak strongly to the desirability of the transfer of

allegiance approach. Yet it has not dominated borrowed servant analy87
sis, perhaps in part because of the beguiling nature of the control test.
Sometimes courts will adopt first one approach, then another, even
within the same jurisdiction, with no recognition of the resulting
inconsistency.88
III.

THE RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY

What guidance on these issues do we receive from the Restatement of Agency? The Restatement is a widely respected and frequently
cited source of agency law. Its control over concepts is clear and the
taxonomical work in the Restatement is superb. Yet its analysis of the
borrowed servant problem lacks focus and seems internally inconsistent. Two sections of the Restatement, Sections 226 and 227, contain
language relevant to this matter. They are discussed below.
87. Of course, the Charles case does not stand alone. See Beatty v. J.B. Owsley & Sons, 280
S.E.2d 484 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), petition for review denied, 285 S.E.2d 95 (N.C. 1981), a case
involving a claim based on negligence by a crane operator who had worked for several months in the
plant of the borrowing (special) employer, subject to detailed control by the borrowing employer.
The court held that the operator had not become a borrowed servant, noting that a general employer
had been held liable in North Carolina "even when the special employer controlled the details of the
work and the manner of doing the work." Id. at 487. See also Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v.
International Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 983, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1986), where the court quoted the following
authority which it found controlling:
[lit is clear that an employee in the special service of a second employer cannot be considered a loaned servant unless he is wholly free from the control of the first employer and
wholly subject to the control of the second employer. Further,it has been held that a person
cannot become an employee of the second employer unless the second employer has the
power to discharge orfire the employee. And the fact that the employee obeys directions or
signals given by the second employer in performing his special service does not make the
employee a loaned servant (quoting Richard v. 111.Bell Tel. Co., 383 N.E.2d 1242, 1249-50
(1978)).
Other representative cases include Chartier v. Winslow Crane Co., 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960);
White v. Bye, 70 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. 1955); and Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., 131 N.E.2d 593
(Ohio App. 1956).
88. For example, not more than a year after the Charles opinion was published the Court of
Appeals in New York decided a case which, while quoting the Charles opinion, departed from it in
fact. In Wagner v. Motor Truck Renting Corp., 136 N.E. 229 (N.Y. 1922), a majority of the Court
of Appeals was content to assign responsibility to a borrowing employer (who in turn subcontracted
to another borrowing employer) in a truck rental situation. Judge Cardozo was one of two dissents,
urging that liability should rest on the general employer.
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226

Section 226 of the Restatement is entitled "Servant Acting for
Two Masters." Its text reads in full as follows: "A person may be the
servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if
the service to one does not involve the abandonment of the service to
the other."" In one respect this language is distinguishable from the
borrowed servant problem because it presumes master-servant relationships, which is the matter at issue in borrowed servant cases. But in
another respect it appears to contradict borrowed servant doctrine in
the overwhelming majority of states by its indifference to the traditional theory that a servant cannot have two masters for the same act
without joint employment. That is, the text of section 226 appears to
deny the long-standing maxim quoted above that "[a] man cannot
serve two masters. He will betray one or the other."9 0
In Illustration 1 of section 226, P employs A to drive a truck and
directs A to obey the orders of B, who has hired the truck by the hour
for advertising purposes, in the management of colored lights used for
lighting a display on the truck. 1 The illustration concludes that A is
P's servant in the driving of the truck and is B's servant in the management of the colored lights.9 2 If A drives negligently because he dimmed
the headlights in order to make the colored lights more conspicuous,
however, "both B and P are subject to liability." ' It is this part of the
hypothetical that directly applies the test of section 226.
89. Comment a of § 226 develops the black letter text a little further by stating that, "[a
person] may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers as to the same act, if the act is within
the scope of employment for both; . .."RESTATEMENT § 226 cmt. a (1957).
90. See the quotation from the Atwood case quoted supra note 68. The maxim "no man can
serve two masters . . ."necessarily underlies the borrowed servant rule in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that search for a single master. The comments to § 226 of the Restatement
contain some language and illustrations that are consistent with the maxim. For example, illustration
4 describes a situation where two persons agree to employ a servant together, each of them paying
half of the wages of the servant. The illustration states that both persons are liable for the negligence
of the servant while carrying out appropriate orders. This is consistent with settled doctrine from all
perspectives because there is no doubt that the servant is acting on behalf of both people. The relationship naturally fits the label "joint employers." Illustration 5 also involves separate payment by
each employer. These situations are distinguishable from the borrowed servant problem. See Colorado and S. Ry. Co. v. Duffy Storage and Moving Co., 361 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1961) (railroad engineer
paid by two separate railroads held to be joint employee of both). Yet curiously the black letter text
on § 226 specifically excludes joint employers from its coverage.
91. The illustration poses a classic borrowed servant situation, yet the text analyzing it gives
no recognition that the doctrine of borrowed servant has any relevance to the facts.
92. The text assumes without further analysis that the control by B makes A the servant of B.
93. See RESTATEMENT § 226 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1957).
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If one applies the text of section 226 as it reads, what is left of the
doctrine of borrowed servant? Section 226 appears to focus solely on
control and abandonment of service. By hypothesis in a borrowed servant situation the servant (A) is acting pursuant to the consent of P,
the general employer, and thus the acts of A do not result in abandonment of the service to P. Also, in such situation A is acting pursuant to
the control of B when the accident happens or B would not be liable, so
A is not abandoning B's service but instead performing it. Thus both P
and B are liable under the analysis of section 226 in every fact situation in which the borrowed servant doctrine would apply, if one applies
literally the language of section 226.
Assuming that section 226 swallows the doctrine of borrowed servant,9 4 it can be argued that this represents a deliberate choice by the
Restatement to adopt the approach of Gordon v. Byers9 5 and to cease
the search for a single master. This argument can be treated seriously,
however, only as long as the reader does not cast a glance at section
227, to be covered shortly.
Section 226 of the Restatement is troubling. 96 It appears to draw
too fine a line, creating confusion in the law, 97 and overemphasizing
94. One could argue that § 226 does indeed recognize the doctrine of borrowed servant in its
analysis, described in the above text, of the factual variations in Illustration 1 where A was only
driving when the accident happened, or only manipulating the lights when somehow he caused injury
to another. In those two instances the analysis is that only P (in the first variation) or B (in the
second) is liable and thus it can be argued that the Illustration recognizes and applies the doctrine of
borrowed servant. But when A was only driving, B was not exercising any control and thus could not
be held liable as a master under any approach to the borrowed servant problem. And the analysis in
the illustration falters under the variation where A causes damage to someone while manipulating
the lights. A straightforward application of the standard posed in the black letter text of § 226
would call for liability of both P and B in that setting because A was not abandoning his service to P
while manipulating the lights. Instead, he was advancing the interests of P (who was renting his
truck and driver to B for that purpose) as well as those of B. Both should be liable under the test
posed in § 226.
95. See supra note 61.
96. The original Reporter for the Restatement did not in his own treatise appear to recognize
the concept underlying § 226. See 2 MECHEM, supra note 29, at 1441, stating that "two different
persons may at the same time severally stand in the attitude of principal or of master in some respect
of the same agent or servant, with reference to different acts which he may perform" (emphasis
added). Professor Mechem died during the preparation of the first edition of the Restatement, while
it was still in a preliminary stage. Professor Seavey became Reporter and completed the project. See
I RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY viii (1933).
97. Suppose, for example, a person hires a taxi and driver for an afternoon in order to do some
shopping at several locations. She gives the driver orders throughout the afternoon on where and
when to drive and at what speed. The driver negligently causes an accident during that period of
time. Both the passenger and the taxi company could be held liable under the literal language of
§ 226. The driver is not abandoning his service to the taxi company when performing services for
the passenger. Also, the driver is performing services for the passenger pursuant to her detailed
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control.9 8 It has enjoyed some judicial recognition, however. It has been

cited by several courts as justification for following Gordon v. Byers
and placing liability on both employers in a non-joint employment
setting. 9
B. SECTION 227
Section 227 is the section of the Restatement devoted exclusively

to the borrowed servant problem. It is entitled "Servant Lent to Another Master." The black letter text states in full as follows: "A servant

directed or permitted by his master to perform services for another
may become the servant of such other in performing the services. He
may become the other's servant as to some acts and not as to others."
This language suggests that the Restatement is adopting the spot
control test. Comment a to section 227 reinforces this assumption. It
focuses on "the specific act done" and states that the borrowing em-

ployer can be characterized as the master if the servant is acting "in
the business of and subject to the direction of the temporary employer
as to the details of such act." 10 0 The language of Comment a makes
instructions and thus theoretically could be characterized as her servant under the standard posed in
§ 226 and its illustrations. Yet it is hard to imagine any court holding a passenger liable for the
negligence of a taxi driver, which underscores the overreach of § 226.
98. See supra notes 43-47, and accompanying text (noting that control alone does not establish a master-servant relationship). There is no evidence of any payment from B to A in Illustration
I, nor any other evidence that would support a transfer of allegiance. Payment is not required to
establish a master-servant relationship in all cases, of course. But the context of the borrowed servant case by hypothesis involves an actor who is employed by another, thus making the inference of
a distinct master-servant relationship unrelated to payment of wages more difficult to draw than
might otherwise be the case.
99. See Brickner v. Normandy Osteopathic Hosp., 746 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (hospital held vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee under the direction and control of an
independent physician, who was also held liable); Tonsic v. Wagner, 329 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1974) (jury
verdict against doctor and in favor of hospital in an operating room setting, pursuant to trial court
instruction that only one of the defendants could be held liable, rev'd, citing § 226); Brimbau v.
Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 440 A.2d 1292 (R.I. 1982) (construction site injury); Kastner v.
Toombs, 611 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1980). It should be noted, however, that the number of cases citing
§ 226 is eclipsed by the much greater number citing § 227, to be covered shortly.
100. The complete text of Comment a reads as follows:
Whether or not the person lent or rented becomes the servant of the one whose immediate
purpose he serves depends in general upon the factors stated in Section 220(2) [listing the
factors used in distinguishing a servant from an independent contractor]. Starting with a
relation of servant to one, he can become the servant of another only if there are the same
elements in his relation to the other as would constitute him a servant of the other were he
not originally the servant of the first. Since the question of liability is always raised because
of some specific act done, the important question is not whether or not he remains the servant
of the general employer as to matters generally, but whether or not, as to the act in question,
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particularly clear its indifference to the matter of allegiance to the borrowing employer in its statement that, "It is not conclusive [in resolving the issue of whose servant the actor is] that in practice he would be
likely to obey the directions of the general employer in case of conflict
of orders." One might ask why that is not conclusive if loyalty is the
essence of the agency relationship, as the Reporter himself stated during the proceedings that promulgated the Restatement. 01
The reader then turns to Comment b of section 227 and is startled
to discover that it restates the Charles test. Comment b states,
"[T]here is an inference that the actor remains in his general employment so long as, by the service rendered another, he is performing the
business entrusted to him by the general employer." Some of the lan-

guage of Comment b is close to that used by Cardozo in his opinion in
Charles.10 For example, the last sentence of Comment b states that,
"There is no inference that because the general employer has permitted

a division of control, he has surrendered it." 103 This language by necessary implication focuses on the allegiance of the actor as the central

point of analysis. It recognizes that control almost always is divided in
the ordinary borrowed servant case but does not let that dictate analysis of the situation. Instead, it draws the common sense inference that
the servant's loyalty ordinarily will remain with the general employer,
he is acting in the business of and under the direction of one or the other. It is not conclusive
that in practice he would be likely to obey the directions of the general employer in case of
conflict of orders. The question is whether it is understood between him and his employers
that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first as to the specific act, or is to be employed in
the business of and subject to the direction of the temporary employer as to the details of
such act. This is a question of fact in each case.
RESTATEMENT § 227 (1957).
101. Supra note 46. Perhaps the Restatement intends to create a special agency relationship
based solely on control in this particular situation. Although this would explain why it is indifferent
to the absence of loyalty between servant and master when the master is the borrowing employer, it
would constitute an odd departure from the core definition of agency contained in § I of the Restatement (supra note 43), a definition which is designed to establish a framework for all 528 sections of the Restatement. Also, what purpose would such a departure serve? As noted earlier (supra
note 51), the borrowing employer is subject to a standard of liability-that of due care-based on its
control. Considering that, what is the point of reaching far outside traditional doctrine to impose
strict liability on the borrowing employer?
102. See supra text accompanying note 75.
103. The complete text of Comment b reads as follows:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is an inference that the actor remains in his
general employment so long as, by the service rendered another, he is performing the business
entrusted to him by the general employer. There is no inference that because the general
employer has permitted a division of control, he has surrendered it.
RESTATEMENT § 227 cmt. b (1957).
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who provides regular employment, and treats that as a serious matter.
Because of this, Comment b concludes that the actor "remains in his
general employment" in a divided control case.
Comment a focuses exclusively on control. Comment b focuses on
the continuing relationship between actor and general employer and argues that the relationship continues even when control is divided between general and borrowing employers. It is frustrating to have to
confront apparent inconsistencies in a work as competent as that of the
Restatement of Agency. Yet it is undeniable that Comments a and b of
section 227 appear flatly inconsistent.
The reader is left with no clear sense of direction concerning the
position of the Restatement. 10 4 In this rare instance it appears to be
taking all sides on a disputed matter with no recognition of the resulting inconsistencies and the problems this poses for the reader. 105
104. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Proceedings of the American Law Institute evidencing any discussion of §§ 226 and 227 for either the first or second editions of the Restatement.
Sections 226 and 227 originally were numbered §§ 451 and 452 in early drafts of the first Restatement, then were renumbered without a change in text. Also, the text was not changed from the first
to the second editions of the Restatement.
105. A point of collateral interest raised in § 227 of the Restatement is the relationship of the
borrowed servant doctrine to the independent contractor doctrine. The first two sentences of Comment a to § 227 address this issue as follows:
Whether or not the person lent or rented becomes the servant of the one whose immediate
purposes he serves depends in general upon the factors stated in Section 220(2) [which distinguishes servants from independent contractors]. Starting with a relation of servant to one, he
can become the servant of another [the borrowing employer] only if there are the same elements in his relation to the other as would constitute him a servant of the other were he not
originally the servant of the first.
RESTATEMENT § 227 cmt. a (1957).
Read literally, this analysis would mean that servants would almost never be borrowed because
there are not "the same elements" in the actor's relation to the borrowing employer. Instead, the
actor was hired by and is paid by another and was directed to work in accordance with the instructions of the borrowing employer. Only the element of control is "the same element." The element of
"on behalf of" is not as easily found. This weakens the analogy to section 220(2), which is devoted
almost exclusively to identifying factors to consider in drawing inferences concerning control over
means of performance. This reading of the first two sentences of Comment a draws support from
Coment c to § 227, where it is stated as follows:
Many of the factors stated in Section 220 which determine that a person is a servant are also
useful in determining whether the lent servant has become the servant of the borrowing employer. Thus a continuation of the general employment is indicated by the fact that the general employer can properly substitute another servant at any time, that the time of the new
employment is short, and that the lent servant has the skill of a specialist.
RESTATEMENT § 227 cmt. c (1957).
This language from Comment c is reminiscent of § 14 L of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 48,
where the inference is drawn that the general employment continues in an ambiguous principal context. In both situations the underlying matter being addressed is loyalty. One assumes that the actor
remains loyal to the general employer, in large part because that is the person who providing pay

1994]

LAW OF BORROWED SERVANT

IV.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The borrowed servant problem lends itself well to economic analysis, particularly as seen through the lens of the general deterrence theory.106 That theory, first articulated by Professor Guido Calabresi, argues that one way to reduce accidents is to require that enterprises
bear their full cost, including the cost of accidents associated with carrying on an enterprise. Such costs would ordinarily be reflected in the
price charged by the business.107 Customers, who are price sensitive,
would be likely to choose safer substitutes on the basis of lesser
price. 108 Accidents thus would be reduced overall because the more accident prone businesses would be less active or be put out of business
altogether. 10 9
and steady employment. It is of interest that comment a to § 14 L gives the following examples of
when a new agency is created: "This is always true where the second employment operates as a
fraud upon the general employer, or where the second employment was consciously concealed by the
parties from the general employer." Those examples clearly turn on the fundamental element of
loyalty.
106. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE LJ 499 (1961).
107. Calabresi explains the role of cost and price as follows:
At its base are certain fundamental ethical postulates. One of these, perhaps the most important, is that by and large people know what is best for themselves. . . . [I]n order for people
to know what they really want they must know the relative costs of producing different goods.
The function of prices is to reflect the actual costs of competing goods, and thus to enable the
buyer to cast an informed vote in making his purchases.
Id. at 502.
108. Although most of the article focuses on placing losses onto industries rather than leaving
them with the victim or absorbing them by government subsidy, Calabresi also directs his attention
to general deterrence within a particular industry. He states as follows:
Similarly, if the costs of accidents vary not only from industry to industry, but among firms
within an industry, and if the difference is substantial enough to be reflected in different
insurance premiums charged to each firm, there is every reason to have these accident costs
placed on each firm. Thus, the product of the low cost more efficient firm will be favored,
enabling that firm to expand at the expense of its guiltless, but more accident prone,
competitor.
Id. at 532.
109. The general deterrence concept is developed more fully in Calabresi's later writings. The
following language from Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and
Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216, 223 (1965) [hereinafter Fault], is helpful in explaining the concept:
Specifically, the thesis holds that although, for instance, we may not want the safest possible
product, we do want the manufacturer to choose a means of production which may be somewhat more expensive in terms of materials used if this expense is made up by savings in
accident costs. Similarly, . . . we may, if we are made to pay for car-caused accidents, drive
less, or less at night, or less when we are of accident-prone ages, or with more safety devices,
than if we are not made to pay for accident costs when we decide to use a car. I call this
thesis general deterrence, because it seeks to diminish accident costs not by directly attacking
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Matters become more complex when several enterprises play a

causal role in a single loss, as in the borrowed servant situation. Although Professor Calabresi did not focus specifically on the borrowed
servant problem, it was the subject of direct analysis in a note in the
Yale Law Journal written from the general deterrence perspective. 110
The Yale Note advanced the thesis that accident costs normally should
be placed on the general employer on the theory that it is better able to

evaluate the risk of accidents and thus reflect the cost of accidents in
its price. A crane company, for example, "has a better statistical background for estimating the likelihood of crane accidents, and thus can
make more accurate insurance and pricing decisions.""' A builder who
hires a crane and operator for a job, on the other hand, would "probably lump all the potential accident costs of his project together and use
a broad insurance policy. He is unlikely to isolate the cost of accidents
involving cranes, for the purpose either of demanding safer practices
from the crane company or of considering safer and cheaper substitutes.""' 2 The crane company thus is the "more efficient riskbearer."' H
The Yale note suggests three limitations to its thesis. First, it recommends reversal of the above priority of liabilities if the borrowing
employer is a better predictor of accidents. The example given is rental
by the borrowing employer of a machine and operator to perform the
same services that a whole fleet of its own machines and employees
perform regularly."' Second, it argues that liability should be shifted
specific occasions of danger, but (like workmen's compensation) by making more expensive
those activities which are accident prone and thereby making more attractive their safer
substitutes.
110. Note, Borrowed Servants and the Theory of Enterprise Liability, 76 YALE LI. 807
(1967).
111. Id.at 817.
112. Id.Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine substitutes for a crane on a construction job. The
construction company nevertheless should be able to exercise a meaningful choice among crane companies, choosing the better run company on the basis of lower price. This reinforces the argument
that crane companies should not be able to avoid having the costs of accidents fully reflected in their
prices by resorting to the borrowed servant doctrine.
113. Id. at 816.
114. This qualification was first recognized in Smith, supra note 41. Professor Smith, after
rejecting the control and whose business tests, argued for a "scope of the business" test. Under that
test liability would be shifted to the borrowing employer if the questioned act is within "the normal
sphere of operations" of the borrowing employer. Id. at 1249. Smith asks whether the activities of
the negligent actor are "sufficiently intimately connected with the conduct of the business that it
should respond for mishaps in the performance of such activities." Id. at 1252. Rental of a machine
and operator to perform the same services that a fleet of the borrowing employer's own machines and
operators perform regularly would constitute conduct within "the scope of the business" of the bor-
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to the borrowing employer if the injury arises from activities outside
the scope of the contract. The example given is where a building contractor uses a crane for some particularly exotic and dangerous purpose
which it did not disclose to the crane company. Third, recovery against
the borrowing employer is advocated if the general employer is judgment proof. This is advocated in order to ensure compensation of victims and to ensure that the price of the final product (the building,
apparently) bears the full accident cost of its production. Questions can
be raised about each of these limitations.

With regard to the first limitation, the fact that the borrowing employer has its own fleet of cranes and operators does not appear to compromise the argument that the business of the general employer is the
superior risk bearer. The customer choice that is central to Professor
Calabresi's theory relates to competing prices. The customer making
the choice of a safer substitute is the borrowing employer; the entrepreneur charging a price is the general employer. It does not aid general
deterrence to increase the costs of the person who is doing the purchasing of the goods or services at issue, whether or not that person already

has similar goods or services available on an internal basis.
The second limitation, addressing the situation where the borrowing employer puts the crane and operator to a risky and unanticipated
use, seems adequately covered by the negligence standard that applies
to persons who, like the borrowing employer in this situation, misuse
control. Resort to vicarious liability does not seem necessary. 115
In the third limitation, the general employer is presumed judgment

proof. However, this fact does not in itself provide justification under
the general deterrence theory for shifting the loss to the borrowing employer. Instead, the reasoning underlying liability for the borrowing
rowing employer. See also Keitz v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 134 A.2d 296 (Md. 1957).
The policy underlying Smith's thesis is "the rarely articulated consideration that a business must
meet its normal burdens." Smith, supra at 1253. Unless the borrowing employer has in fact and in
good faith farmed out that portion of its business, it should pay the loss on the reasoning that "a
business should pay its passage." Id. at 1223.
While this reasoning is not as sophisticated as the concept of general deterrence and superior
risk bearer, it seems to express the same fundamental idea. A question remains, however. Why is not
the negligent act also within the "scope of the business" of the lender? Its business consists of lending workers and equipment to others for a fee. That business also should have to "pay its passage."
If one acknowledges that sometimes the negligent act is within the scope of the business of both
businesses, one again is left without a clear sense of direction.
115. Alternatively, one could argue that the conduct of the negligent actor in participating in
this risky and unanticipated use is outside of the scope of employment of the general employer. If
that is the case, then a plausible argument for an agency relationship with the borrowing employer
for that particular act could be made.
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employer under this circumstance appears to be deep pocket in nature.
That is, the borrowing employer is assessed liability because it has the
resources to respond to a judgment and is related to the loss in a causal
way.11 6 While deep pocket reasoning may in fact underlie much of the

rationalization for respondeat superior liability, 11 7 it has never found
favor as a principled," 8 fair justification for imposing vicarious liability
upon a person."1 9 Also, the third limitation undermines the goal of con116. If one adopts compensation as the overriding interest to be advanced, the approach of
Gordon v. Byers, supra note 61, seems preferable. It is not a large step to dual liability from reasoning that the borrowing employer should be liable if the general employer proves insolvent. Also,
under dual liability the two employers are in a contractual relationship and thus, with minimal
transaction costs, can anticipate and allocate the costs of liability among themselves in a jurisdiction
that imposes it on both of them. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
I (1960). Professor Calabresi briefly addressed this argument in Fault, supra note 109, where he
acknowledged that sometimes it makes no difference which party in a contractual relationship the
loss is placed upon, but then stated as follows:
But it may make a great deal of difference. Among the factors which operate to determine
who is the better loss bearer from a general deterrence point of view are: (1) which of the
parties can better evaluate the risk involved; (2) which of the parties can better evaluate the
accident proneness of potential parties on the other side; (3) which of the parties can better
let this knowledge, when significant, be reflected in the prices it can command; (4) which of
the parties can most cheaply insure against the liability .
Id. at 230-31.
It can be argued that each of these four factors point to continued liability for the general
employer. Also, the case of Elliott Crane Serv. v. H.G. Hill Stores, 840 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1992), proves that it is not always possible to sort things out by contract. In Elliott, the court held
an indemnity contract between the general and borrowing employers void under a Tennessee statute
declaring indemnity agreements in connection with or collateral to construction contracts against
public policy. Also, not all transfers of service are pursuant to a contractual relationship. The case of
White v. Bye, 70 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. 1955), involved a gratuitous transfer between subcontractors
on a construction site of a crane and operator for a momentary job. No realistic opportunity for
allocation of risk exists under such circumstances, which involves conduct on the spur of the
moment.
117. See THOMAS BATY. VICARIous LIABILITY (1916), suggesting that the real basis for respondeat superior is that servants are impecunious and masters usually solvent. "[Tihe damages are
taken from a deep pocket." Id. at 154.
118. See Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master's Indemnity, 20 MOD. L.
REv. 220, 232 (1957):
What other theory is there? Well, there is the purely cynical theory that the master is liable
because he has a purse worth opening. The master is frequently rich, and he is usually insured-two arguments that might be used by any burglar, if he ever troubled to justify his
thefts. The strange thing is to find them put forward by judges of eminence.
119. For an illustration that may raise doubts about the fairness of imposing vicarious liability
upon someone who is insured and who plays a causal role in a loss, consider the case of a homeowner
who purchases a new hot water heater, complete with installation. She sets a time for the plumber
who sold it to her to make the installation. The plumber negligently causes an accident and injures a
third party while driving to the home to install the hot water heater. He was speeding because he
had let himself fall behind schedule for that day. Should the homeowner be included among those
liable for the resulting loss? She is causally related to the loss because it would not have happened if
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sistency and predictability by requiring an additional factual inquiry
(into solvency) and by creating a fictional agency relationship in order
to advance the cause of compensation.
With the exception of the above limitations, the economic analysis
in the Yale Comment supports the thesis of this article. It is true that
the reasoning is different. Nothing is said about the fundamental elements of the agency relationship; instead, a search is made for the superior risk bearer. 12 0 But the result is the same. Those supporting this
approach may find themselves in agreement with the statement that
this is one of many instances where the intuitive sense of the common
law, expressed in the fundamental elements of the agency relationship,
is consistent with economic analysis."2 '
CONCLUSION

The conflict among the spot control, dual liability, and transfer of
allegiance tests demonstrates that the law in this area is in chaos, as
Judge Cardozo noted seventy years ago. There has been no improvement in the intervening seventy years. Sometimes uncertainty in the
law is understandable and seemingly inevitable, where close questions
raising conflicting matters of policy are at issue. The law of borrowed
the plumber had not been driving directly to her home in order to do the installation. And a homeowner carries liability insurance as part of homeowner fire insurance coverage in nearly all states.
See EMMET J. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 425 (5th ed. 1989). Yet even
today a finding of liability for a homeowner under such circumstances would shock most legal observers because it is so blatantly based on nothing more substantial that deep pocket reasoning.
120. See also Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 153 (1976), stressing the control a hospital has over the "economic well being" of its nurses
and the control it has through "its personnel policies, from recruitment to firing," in characterizing
the hospital as the superior risk bearer in a hospital injury case. Id. at 199.
121. Reasoning by economic analysis has not always been fully embraced by others. For example, the analysis of the Yale note was specifically commented on in the case of Kiefer Concrete,
Inc. v. Hoffman, 562 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1977). The case involved a borrowed servant issue resulting
from a crane accident. After describing the analysis of the Yale note identifying the crane company
as the more efficient risk bearer, the court stated as follows: "Because of the empirical nature of the
presumptions underlying such views, and the fact that the record in this case (as in most cases) is
devoid of a basis for supporting such an assumption, we do not deem it prudent to adopt such a
position on this issue.". Id. at 748 n.4.
The court's hesitation to accept the general deterrence theory as the rationale for decision in
place of traditional common law analysis is understandable. The court is being asked to leave behind
familiar language and concepts and to leap into the unknown, adopting a different language and set
of assumptions, much of which is subject to dispute. One person's assumption about who is the more
efficient risk bearer or the cheapest cost avoider can be contradicted by others, resulting in a lack of
focus and certainty. Nevertheless, the Kiefer court may not have intended to deny altogether the
usefulness of economic analysis. Economic analysis can play an important role, not the least of which
is reinforcing and providing a cogent explanation for much of the intuitive basis of the common law.
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servant raises no such conflict of policy, however, nor does it seem so
complicated as to invite confusion among the courts. It thus is mystifying why the courts have not long ago settled this matter. Perhaps the
mesmerizing effect of the word "control" accounts for this. It is clear
that the desire to compensate victims, which sometimes plays a major
role in introducing uncertainty into the law, cannot be assigned much
of the blame for the chaos in this area. As noted above,12 2 one of the
effects of the spot control rule, a major line of authority in the law of
borrowed servant, is to reduce compensation for victims in many cases.
It is argued above that much of the uncertainty can be avoided by
giving full effect to the "on behalf of" element of the agency relationship. This translates into an inquiry into allegiance, or loyalty. Recognition of the special significance of loyalty will not resolve all questions,
of course. It is not always easy, for example, to distinguish between
actions that are taken on behalf of a person and those that merely benefit a person, especially in this setting where the actor in many borrowed servant cases is simultaneously advancing the interests of several
different people. Also, loyalty is not an instantly identifiable quality,
particularly under the sometimes complex circumstances and relationships that can arise in this area. In addition, doctrinal boundaries tend
to blur when they conflict or appear to conflict with the goal of compensating victims of negligence. Nevertheless, some progress can be
made in removing the stain of "chaos" from this area of the law by
redirecting the inquiry to include loyalty and by recognizing the inference that ordinarily the general employment continues.
The law is complex, and daily becomes more so. This intensifies
the need to adopt clear rules whenever the interests of justice make this
feasible. Indeed, the interests of justice are defined in part as clarity
and predictability in the law. Courts can contribute toward this goal by
ending confusion and inconsistency in the common law of borrowed servants. This article proposes that the goal of certainty and predictability
be advanced by confining liability to the general employer except in
extraordinary circumstances, a result which is consistent with the fundamental principles of the law of agency.

122.

See supra note 27.

